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RECENT CASES
VENDOR AND PURCHASER-RISK OF LOSS-RIGHT TO
PROCEEDS OF INSURANCE POLICY-The defendant-vendor
had entered into a contract for the sale of property for
$20,000. Pending its completion, a building insured by the
vendor for $10,000 was destroyed. The trial court granted
the purchaser specific performance and an abatement in the
purchase price in the amount of the insurance proceeds. On
appeal the Supreme Court of Missouri held, in affirming the
decision of the lower court, that the doctrine of equitable
conversion was misplaced and should not be applied. In
dissenting, three justices argued that the substitution of the
insurance proceeds for the res without evidence as to the
actual damage suffered by the purchaser was in fact the
application of this rejected doctrine. Skelly Oil Co. v. Ash-
more, 365 S.W.2d 582 (Mo. 1963).
The majority of jurisdictions, including North Dakota,
hold that when property is destroyed pending the completion
of a contract for sale, the vendor holds the proceeds of his
insurance policy in trust for the purchaser absent any agree-
ment to the contrary.' Two legal fictions produce this
result: 1) the equitable conversion doctrine,2 and 2) the
substitution of the insurance proceeds for the destroyed res2
The equitable conversion doctrine has been severely
criticized as misplaced, if not unsound, by legal scholars; 4
and was rejected by the court in the instant case. The
majority decision professed to apply the Massachusetts rule5
1. McGinley v. Forrest, 107 Neb. 309, 186 N.W. 74 (1921): Raplee v.
Piper, 2 App. Div. 732, 152 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1956), nff'1 d, 143 N.E.2d 919; Gunsch
v. Gunsch, 71 N.W.2d 623, 630 (N.D. 1955) "When a loss occured for which
the vendor collected insurance, the amount so collected must be applied in
reduction of the amount due on the contract."; Russell v. Elliot. 45 S.D.
184, 186 N.W. 824 (1922); Rayner v. Preston, 18 Ch. D. 1 (1881) (dissent);
see 34 N.D.L. Rev. 182, 183 n. 8.
2. Woodward v. McCollum, 16 N.D. 42, 111 N.W. 623 (1907); see Parr-
Richmond Industrial Corp. v. Bloyd, 272 P.2d 16, 22 (Cal. 1954) where the
court states: "The doctrine 'is a mere fiction. Equity regards things which
are directed to be done as having actually been performed where nothing
has intervened to prevent such a performance.'"
3. Raplee v. Piper, supra note 1.
4. 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 942 (Rev. ed. 1936); Pound. The Pro-
gress of the Losw, 1819-1919--Equity, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 813, 829-30 (1920).
5. Libman v. Levenson, 236 Mass. 221, 128 N.E. 13 (1920).
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which, instead of arbitrarily placing the loss on the purchaser
by declaring that the vendor becomes trustee of the legal
title for the purchaser, attempts to do what is equitable.
The only reason why a contract for sale should operate to
effect conversion is that a court of equity will compel specific
performance of it. 7  Where buildings constituting a large
part of the total price have been destroyed the contract
should no longer be enforced." Where they are not material,
equity should grant specific performance subject to compen-
sation for damages.9 Basically this is the law applied in
equity actions where the subject matter of the contract is
personal property. 10
However the substitution of the proceeds of an insurance
policy for destroyed property seems to be the antithesis of
the Massachusetts rule. Instead of holding the property for
the purchaser, the vendor is arbitrarily required to hold the
proceeds in trust. It is as much a fiction to consider an
insurance policy as part of the res bargained for,1 as it is
to consider the proceeds as being held in trust under the
doctrine of equitable conversion. Insurance is a contract of
indemnity personal to the insured. 12 To permit this substi-
tution is to permit the purchaser, merely because he is the
beneficiary of this fictitional trust, to be unjustly enriched in
those instances where the proceeds exceed his injury. 3
A minority of American courts, basing their decision on
Rayner v. Preston, 3 deny to the purchaser the right to the
proceeds.14 These courts are further aided in reaching this
6. See Coolidge & Sickler v. Regn, 7 N.J. 93, 80 A.2d 554 (1951) for
succinct statement of rule concerning risk of loss.
7. Stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract, 13 Colum. L. Rev. 369.
386 (1913).
8. Libman v. Levenson, supra note 5.
9. Milkes v. Smith, 91 Cal. App. 2d 79, 204 P.2d 419 (1949); Gilles v.
Bonelle-Adams Co., 284 Mass. 176, 187 N.E. 535 (1933); ef. Henschke v.
Young, 224 Minn. 339, 28 N.W.2d 766 (1947) (Deficiency in quantity of land).
10. Texas Co. v. Hogarth Shipping Corp., 256 U.S. 619, 629-30 (1920)
"[I]f before the time for performance and without the default of either
party the particular thing ceases to exist or be available for the purpose,
the contract shall be dissolved and the parties excused from performing
it.,
11. Pound, supra note 4.
12. Rayner v. Preston, 18 Ch. D. 1 (1881); cf. Russell v. Williams, 24
Cal. Rptr. 859, 374 P.2d 827 (1962).
13. 18 Ch. D. 1 (1881).
14. White v. Gilman, 138 Cal. 375, 71 Pac. 436 (1903); Brownell v.
Board of Education, 239 N.Y. 369, 146 N.E. 630 (1925). But see Raplee v.
Piper, supra note 1.
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decision by the refusal of their jurisdictions to accept the
risk of loss doctrine.
It is submitted that since insurance proceeds are not
always the true yardstick of damage to the property, legal
title to the insurance fund should be left in the vendor; and
that where the damage is not so great as to void the contract,
the purchase price should be paid less the amount of damages,
if any, which the vendee may establish.
BERNARD J. HAUGEN
NEGLIGENCE - EVIDENCE - ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR
ACCIDENTS TO SHOW NOTICE OR KNOWLEDGE OF DANGER-
Plaintiff fell and was injured as a result of slipping on a
lettuce leaf lying on the ramp leading from defendant's store.
From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant
appealed. The lower court allowed into evidence testimony
that a few weeks earlier on two separate occasions someone
else had slipped and fallen on the ramp; the first time
because of "some smear or wet spot" and the second time
because of "some green leafy vegetable." This evidence was
allowed to show the defendant's notice and knowledge of the
dangerous condition of the ramp. The Supreme Court of
Nevada held, in reversing the judgment, that the evidence
was prejudicial. They held such evidence of prior accidents
inadmissible when they were related to a temporary condition.
Eldorado Club Inc. v. Graff, 377 P.2d 174 (Nev. 1962)
Evidence of other similar accidents is admissible only
when meeting established judicial criteria. Generally, to be
admissible, the prior accident must have occurred at the
same place' and under substantially the same circum-
stances.2 Remoteness of time is also a determining factor
as to admissibility:3 The evidence cannot be admitted to
1. Lindquist v. Des Moines Union Ry. Co., 239 Iowa 356, 30 N.W.2d
120 (1947). Herein the Iowa Supreme Court overruled former decisions.
now allowing such evidence.
2. Lyon v. Dr. Scholl's Foot Comfort Shops, 251 Minn. 285, 87 N.W.2d
651. (1958); Henderson v. Bjork Monument Co., 222 Minn. 241, 24 N.W.2d 42
(1946).
3. Slow Development Company v. Coulter, 88 Ariz. 122, 353 P.2d 890(1960). The Arizona court also treated the requirement of the same place
in a liberal way.
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